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It is a great honour for me to be asked to speak at this 
World Trade Conference. And it Is always a pleasure to 
visit this glittering city on the edge of the Pacific. 
Today it is a double pleasure for the Commission of the 
European Communities will shortly be setting up in San 
Francisco a West Coast Office. But for a European a visit 
here ls also a challenge. Because no European can 1 ive in 
the United States without realizing that over the last 
twenty years there has been a great shift in terms of money 
and power from the Northeastern triangle to the West and the 
South. And this must raise with all of you the question of 
the relationship with Europe. A Texan banker once told me 
that Europe was an obsession of the East coast 
establishment. There is much talk - understandably so - of 
the Pacific Rim. So where exactly is Europe and does it 
matter when you get there? Let me give you some Qardheaded 
reasons why the relationship with Europe still matters • 
... 
First, the sheer size of transatlantic trade. In 1987, the 
twelve-member European Community emerged as the largest 
export market of the United States - and as a customs union 
with a single external tariff and no tariffs between our 
Member States, we are entitled to regard ourselves as one 
market. That year, US exports to the Community totalled 
$60.6 blllfon, compared with $59.8 bill Jon to Canada and 
~ $28.2 bill fon to Japan. Total US trade (exports and 
imports) with the Community was $145 bill Jon. And all this 
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over low tarJffs and wJth very few import restrJctions. As 
George Shultz saJd Jn Brussels several years back, we must 
be doing something right. 
The second reason goes wJder. The Community accounts for 
something 1 ike one fifth of world trade, the United States 
for about fJfteen percent. Together we account for more 
than one third of world trade. This places very heavy 
responsibilities on us both. For if any mutual escalation 
of trade restrictions were to break out, if the shutters 
were to come clanging down on both sides of the Atlantic, 
the one world trading system which has over the last forty 
years underpinned the biggest rise in prosperity in the 
recorded history of the world would be bust, and we would be 
back sooner than many of you could believe not only to the 
poverty and the misery of the 1930s, but to some of the 
terrible political ghosts which haunt every journey through 
an economic wasteland. 
The third reason goes even wider. Europe and the United 
States, whatever arguments we may have from time to time, 
share common democratic values. No European should forget 
the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the founding of the 
North Atlantic Treaty OrganlzatJon Jn the common defense of 
freedom, and the generous and statesmanlike support which 
~ the United States gave to the begJnning of European 
unification in the 1950s. These common values are not put 
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at risk by trade disputes, but the solidarity of the Western 
All lance would inevitably be shaken by an all-out trade war. 
All this is not to say that the international economic 
environment depends only on the transatlantic relationship. 
Quite apart from the problems that you have with Japan and 
some Industrializing countries tn East Asta, there are some 
formidable general questions. Can the debt crisis of the 
developing countries be maintained by prudence and wisdom 
from both borrowers and lenders? Can exchange rate 
instability be contained before it puts an intolerable 
strain on the one world trading system? But a lot depends 
on the arguments which the European Community and the United 
States are having. Let me set out these areas of dissent. 
Let me begin with one area where there is little or no 
dissent. That is the US/Canada Free Trade Agreement 
negotiated but yet to be approved in the United States and 
Canada. Do the Europeans object? The answer is "No". Some 
of you might be surprised at this answer. The Agreement 
will mean that Americans and Canadians will buy more of each 
others' goods when they might have bought European goods. 
But the international trading rules on this question are 
quite clear. If a free trade arrangement between two or 
more countries can pass two simple tests, it is fully 
· permissible. The first test Is that it covers a substantial 
part of all the trade. The second ls that it creates no new 
~ , . 
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obstacles to trade with third countries. Countries 
concluding a free trade arrangement which passes these tests 
do not owe compensation to third parties for any trade 
diversion which might occur. This is because the founders 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade believed with 
the late Professor Viner that freeing trade completely 
between two or more states leads to more trade creation than 
trade diversion. As President Kennedy used to say, "a 
rising tide lifts all boats". 
We shall have some points of detail to discuss on this 
extensive and complex agreement. But let us hope that then 
it can go through. Over all, it should be good for the 
United States, good for Canada and good for all their 
trading partners. 
Now, what are the areas where we do not agree? 
The first is agriculture. This is a subject festooned with 
myths. The first myth is that the European Community is 
subsidizing its farmers 1 ike crazy. The fact is that in 
1986, the European Community spent $23 bill ion on eleven 
mill ion farmers. The Federal Government here spent $26 
bill ton on two mill ion farmers. This does not mean that we 
are right and you are wrong. It simply means that we are 
· both sinners in the eyes of the Lord. 
• I • 
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The second myth is that by the Common Agricultural Pol icy, 
the European Community is slamming the door on American farm 
exports. The fact is that we are the American farmers' 
biggest customer, taking year-in year-out no less than one 
fourth of American farm exports (nearly 7 bill ion last 
year). This is much more than was sold to Canada, Mexico, 
South Korea and the whole of North Africa combined. 
The third myth is that we, with our subsidies to farmers, 
are taking the bread out of the mouths of American farmers 
in third markets. Now, the international trading rules here 
are quite clear. Agricultural subsidies are recognized as a 
fact of 1 ife. Adam Smith would have disapproved, but he 
would have done poorly in the primaries on both sides of the 
Atlantic. What the rules provide is that subsidies should 
not be used to get more than an equitable share of world 
trade. In other words, no-one should use subsidies to get a 
rapidly-increasing share of the world market. 
The European Community and the United States only compete 
essentially over about one fourth of American farm exports -
essentially wheat and dairy products. How have these fared? 
The high water mark of American wheat exports was 1981 - 49 
percent of the world market; five years later that was down 
to 35 percent. Was this the fault of the wicked Europeans? 
· Hardly. Because our share of the world's market over that 
period fluctuated only between 12 and 14 percent - and that 
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with stockpiling which, as you know, costs. In the case of 
dairy products, for years the United States exported very 
little. Its share of the world market has now grown to over 
10 percent - at the Community's expense. 
These facts deserve to be put on record. But I would 1 ike 
to say that I hope we can now move beyond a confrontation. 
In the OECD last year, there was general agreement that the 
basic cause of problems in world agricultural trade was 
excessive subsidization, leading to excessive production 
poured remorselessly on a saturated world market. So, in 
the new round of multilateral trade negotiations (launched 
in the Fall of 1986) we have got to get to grips with this 
problem of reducing subsidies. The United States has 
proposed the complete abolition of agricultural subsidies 
over a period of ten to twelve years. Frankly, we do not 
think this realistic. I would not be surprised if some in 
the United States were to Join us in this view. What we are 
suggesting is a substantial yet internationally-balanced 
reduction in agricult~ral subsidies. And we can say that we 
have made a start - a major and painful start. We have so 
squeezed our dairy farmers over the last three years that 
milk production would be twenty-five percent higher this 
year tf these measures had not been brought into effect. By 
1989, five mill ion cows will have been slaughtered -
equivalent to half the USA's dairy herd. Our butter stocks 
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- 1.3 mill ion tonnes in 1986 - will be considerably below 
300,000 tonnes at the end of 1988. And all this at a time 
when other producers in North America, Austral ta and New 
Zealand are continuing to boost output. Support for cereals 
production has been cut with the result that prices dropped 
in real terms by 25 percent between 1984 and 1987. Similar 
cuts have been made In all other major product areas (sugar, 
oilseeds and wine, for example). And in February, our Heads 
of Government agreed to a draconian restriction in future 
agricultural expenditure - no increases exceeding rather 
less than two percent per year over the next four years, 
this to be automatfcally enforced by sharp cuts in support 
if far from generous production 1 imits are exceeded. 
So, we feel - and our farmers feel - that we have already 
gone quite some way down the road to reducing agr1cultural 
subsidies. Indeed, our farmers are asking what equivalent 
action the United States is taking. It is all very well 
marching along with a vision of what the world might be 1 ike 
in twelve years time. But with your head in the stars, you 
risk falling Into some potholes on the way. We think we 
need some emergency international action on the products in 
most dfsarray and a substantial, politically realistic and 
balanced reduction in subsidies. Let us hope that reason 
will prevail and that we can get a settlement on these lines 
In the new round of trade negotiations now under way .• 
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Second, the Industrial sector. Here, the argument is mainly 
about airbus. Are the Europeans again subsidizing the 
production of airbus like crazy and taking the bread out of 
the mouths of Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas? Here again one 
needs to turn to the international trading rules, to which 
the United States Is a full party. The Agreement on Trade 
In Civil Aircraft- signed in 1979 does not prohibit 
subsidies, it recognizes their existence. But if anyone can 
show that subsidies elsewhere are harming them, they can 
take their case to the GATT and ask for compensation. But 
the steadily increasing sales of Boeing and 
McDonnell-Douglas make a convincing case on these 1 Ines a 
1 ittle difficult to sustain. Moreover, Airbus are clear 
that they will be ab1e to repay during the next decade in 
full measure the money they have borrowed from four of our 
Member State Governments. They maintain this on the basis 
of some 450 orders for the A-320 and one hundred or so 
orders - still coming in - for the A-340. Do not 
-
underestimate a very strong feeling in Europe about European 
access to the world civil aircraft market. Europeans can 
build planes. Some of you here might remember the Spitfire, 
the Lancaster bomber and the Messerschmidt 109. If we can 
build planes which can sell and which are economically 
viable we think we have a reasonable right to part - and 
only part - of the huge world market for civil aircraft in 
the 1990s. But we do not want any more than you do to pour 
taxpayers' money down the rathole. Some discipline on 
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Government support is reasonable. On this basis, I hope we 
shall be able to reach agreement over the coming months. 
And then there is the trade b I 11. The trade bi 11 In the 
form in which ft went to the President and which faces a 
1 ikely veto ls certainly less objectionable than the 
original version. The so-called Gephardt Amendment (which 
called for automatic penalties for countries with more than 
a certain level of balance of payments surplus with the 
United States) and the Bryant Amendment (which would have 
hindered foreign investment in the United States) have gone. 
But the bill which went to the President still has features 
which cause us concern: measures on extraterritoriality, 
measures which encourage drop-of-the-hat action on foreign 
unfair trading practices. "Why not?" you might ask. The 
answer is that there are no saints and sinners in 
international trade. We are all sinners in the eyes of the 
Lord. 
Every year the Trade Representative's office in Washington 
produces a list - which they have every right to do - of 
foreign trading practices to which they object. In a spirit 
of friendly reciprocity, we also produce a list every year 
of what we call "US Practices which Impede trade". I will 
gladly send a copy to anyone who asks of this 26-page 1 ist. 
· The way to deal with these practices - which we all have and 
to which others object - Is to sit down as we have done over 
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the last forty years and to negotiatiate their abandonment 
multilaterally and reciprocally and not with a gun pointing 
at the other fellow's head. 
What will happen now with the trade bill? No-one can tell. 
But while we recognize the situation has Improved, we still 
have our concerns. Whatever happens, we shall not hesitate 
to defend our rights in the GATT. 
Then, finally, macroeconomic issues. The feeling is often 
voiced here that the Europeans are not growing fast enough, 
that if they did, the American balance of trade problem 
would be solved. This is hogwash. Marty Feldstein, a 
former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, 
recently calculated that if European and Japanese growth 
rates were doubled, this might mean a reduction of some $10 
bill ion in an American balance of payments deficit of close 
to $150 billion. 
Secondly, are the Europeans stumblebums in the growth 
league? The facts hardly bear this out. From 1970 through 
1980, average annual growth in terms of GNP was 2.7 percent 
in the US and 3 percent for the European Community. True 
that In 1984 there was a spectacular rise in US growth. But 
this followed a deeper recession than European had had and 
· would not continue. In 1986, European Community growth was 
2.6 percent, while the US economy expanded by 2.9 percent. 
• 'I 
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In 1987, the ffgures were: EC 2.4 percent, US 2.9 percent. 
In 1988, we reckon that we shall both expand at about the 
same rate - around two percent. 
So, our track record is not so different. But this does not 
mean that we in the Community do not want to grow faster. 
We have a major unemployment problem, 13 mill Ion people -
11.5 percent of our working populations. So we need to 
grow. How? We have not yet got a common economic policy. 
The Federal German Government - often mentioned in this 
context - considers for its part that it has made - and 
promised - the most in the way of tax reductions, which it 
can prudently envisage. It does not believe in the "quick 
fix" 1 ike 1978, which led to a headache the following year 
in terms of inflation. We believe in steady and sustained 
growth. And here we think our major contribution is what we 
call "Operation 1992 - the creation of a truly single market 
in Europe". 
Tariffs between Member States have already been abolished. 
But other barriers remain: frontier formalities - 1 Ines of 
trucks at each Member State frontier with drfvers waiting 
for hours to get documents stamped; different technical 
standards and government purchasing requirements which are 
often protectionist; frontier controls necessary because 
rates of sales tax vary very widely between Member States. 
The Commission's Action Programme put forward to the Council 
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in 1985 specified 300 measures - with a name tag and 
timetable attached to each, which would be necessary to 
sweep away these barriers. The aim is to achieve by 1992 a 
single market of 320 mill ion people in which businessmen -
whether they are American or European - can trade and Invest 
as easily as they can in the United States. 
This freeing of a huge internal market should mean a 
tougher, more competitive but also a much more prosperous 
Europe. A recent detailed study which we commissioned in 
Brussels shows that the Community's Gross Domestic Product 
could be increased by some five percent - that Is, $260 
bill ion; unemployment could be reduced by two mill ion jobs -
indeed, by five mill ion if promoted by appropriate economic 
po l i c i e s. 
What will this mean for the United States? Would a United 
Europe mean a Fortress Europe? No. The EC accounts for 
.•. 
some twenty percent of world trade - compared with about 15 
percent in the case of the United States, and, with ten 
percent of Its GNP dependent on its exports to third 
countries, it has even more interest than any of its trading 
partners in maintaining the one world trading system created 
over 40 years ago under the aegis of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. To imagine, therefore, that freeing 
trade in, say, toys or thermometers would be accompanied by 
Increased tariffs against the outside world would be absurd. 
'\ ~ 
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Equally clearly, when there is a question of say, new areas 
of government purchasing or services - not so far covered by 
the GATT. Opening up our market depends on what can be 
regulated multilaterally in the GATT. We are confident that 
on this basis, a mutually satisfactory solution can be 
found. 
We remain firm in the belief that a major increase in the 
prosperity of Europe will mean that the EC will be an even 
bigger market for American exports and American investment. 
Our progress towards 1992 will be for us an event comparable 
with the opening of the American West. It means an exciting 
future for Europe and its trading partners. Let us enter it 
in partnership and friendship with our biggest trading 
partner - what Churchill once called "The Great Republic -
The United States of America". 
